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Abstract 
Successful electricity industry reform depends on the presence of an appropriately staffed 
regulatory agency for the liberalised sector. However developing countries can have 
resource constraints that make the establishment of an effective regulatory agency difficult. 
This paper attempts an econometric modelling of staff numbers in electricity regulatory 
institutions. We specify a model of the determinants of staff numbers that reflects 
electricity system complexity as well as national economic and regulatory environments. 
We empirically estimate a translog cost function specification of the model using data on 
60 electricity regulators collected from an international questionnaire survey in 2000-01. 
We conclude that there are significant differences between the regulatory cost functions of 
developed and developing countries and that, in establishing independent regulatory 
agencies, developing countries face high fixed costs relative to market size. 
 
JEL Classification: L30; N40; O15. 
Keywords: Electricity Regulation; International Comparisons; Human Resources. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Governments in many countries, developing and developed alike, have begun to allow 
private initiatives in infrastructure investments and services, both to enhance efficiency and 
to ease the strain on public finances. As part of the reform process, restructuring has 
usually been accompanied by the introduction of new utility regulatory institutions. The 
economic regulation of decentralised and usually wholly or partially privatised electricity 
industries in most of the developed world, and in some large developing countries, appears 
to have increased both the numbers of people involved in regulation and certainly the 
complexity and skill levels of the staff involved in regulation. The situation in small and 
low-income developing countries is quite different in many respects. On the one hand, 
utility regulatory institutions are relatively new and small, covering several sectors; and, 
conversely, there is a common belief that they are understaffed, particularly with respect to 
the employment of experienced professionals.  This paper uses econometric regression 
analysis to shed light on the extent to which institutional capability may be a problem in 
this area. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some theoretical issues relating to 
the design of a regulatory institution. Section 3 extends the analysis in section 2 to discuss 
the issues of scope and the choice of design in both developed and developing countries. 
Section 4 discusses the model used in this paper to evaluate human resource deficiencies. 
Section 5 details the data collection method and the actual dataset used. In section 6 the 
results are presented and discussed in the context of small developing countries. Section 7 
provides a short conclusion. 
 
2. The Importance of Human Resources in Effective Regulation 
 
The design of “effective” regulatory institutions involves defining the regulatory scope and 
policies that should accompany ESI reforms. There is a growing literature on what 
constitutes an effective regulatory system. Stern and Holder (1999: 43), for instance, 
suggest that regulatory institutions should be characterised by Clarity of roles and 
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objectives, Autonomy from political intervention, wide Participation by (or consultation 
with) relevant stakeholders, Accountability to outside agencies, Transparency of decision 
making process and Predictability of decisions. 
 
In practice, the attainment of the six criteria above hinges on the availability and use of an 
adequate supply of economic resources, particularly the supply of trained staff involved in 
regulation. Estache and Mortimort (1999), Knack and Keefer (1995), Levy and Spiller 
(1996), Gray (1998) and Stern (2001) agree on the importance of adequate human 
capabilities to provide for effective regulation. It is not just the total numbers of staff but a 
sufficient pool of professionally qualified ones (lawyers, technicians, economists and 
accountants, among others) that will provide for the critical institutional continuity of 
regulation. Such an institutional base will in turn provide for the required quality and 
ability of regulatory systems. A strong professionally trained administration should also be 
better able to maintain policy stability in the face of political instabilities (Bergara et al., 
1998). 
 
Most of the empirical work on utility regulation such as Buckle (1999) and Spiller et al. 
(1997) consist of case studies on telecommunication regulation. Stern (2001) investigates 
whether or not there is a problem in the supply of resources for utility (electricity and 
telecommunications) regulation in small and low-income countries; to estimate its potential 
severity and, finally, to consider some potential options for how it might be tackled. None 
of these studies applied econometric analysis to the issue.  
 
In many large developed countries, such as the UK and the USA, regulators do possess 
most if not all of the ‘desirable characteristics’ owing to their favourable endowment of 
human capital and legal institutions, but the economic and social structure of small 
developing countries may act as real obstacles in achieving them. Large developing, middle 
income nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia and the Philippines appear to 
have been able to cope with the staffing needs of their regulatory institutions, but for low 
income Asian and African countries and most of the small island states (such as Grenada or 
St. Lucia), the problem of the supply of adequate human capability is much more acute.  
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The problem in developing countries seems to be exacerbated by their prevailing poor 
governance structure. The recent 2002 World Development Report (WDR, 2001) stresses 
the importance of clear governance rules for developing countries. It reports that, in 
general, lower income countries tend to have more barriers to regulatory reforms and to the 
introduction of competition (see WDR,2001, Chapter 8).  This also implies that poor 
governance rules not only affect the number of personnel that regulatory institutions can 
employ, but also the ability of such staff to function effectively. 
 
A pervasive feature of many (but by no means all) developing countries is the high level of 
government corruption, which increases the need for uncorruptprofessionally trained staff 
in regulation, in order to counterbalance the more difficult governance structure. However, 
governments in countries with high levels of corruption may also wish to use utility 
regulators (particularly Ministry regulators) as a method of creating jobs – or jobs for 
favoured people.  This is likely, ceteris paribus, to increase the numbers of total staff but 
its effect on the numbers of professional staff actually employed is ambiguous since poor 
governance structures may also be accompanied by a considerable lack of qualified 
manpower necessary to bring change and to support institutions. In such a situation the 
qualifications of the professional staff may be of doubtful quality and relevance.  Also, 
there may be an unwillingness on the part of appropriately qualified professionals to work 
in the regulatory agencies where governance is poor and/or corruption is widespread.  In 
these circumstances, the recruitment policies of the regulatory institutions are likely to be 
subject to political pressures of various kinds.  
 
In consequence, we would suggest that, if there is a premium attached to good governance,  
countries with low levels of corruption are more likely to promote effective regulation, as 
Stern (2001) indicates in the case of Botswana.  Less corrupt countries may (cet par) 
therefore prefer to have larger regulatory institutions with a higher proportion of 
appropriately qualified professional staff – resource constraints permitting.  
evy and Spiller (1996) have developed a framework to analyse the interaction of the 
institutional endowment of a country, the nature of its regulatory institutions, and 
performance. They emphasise that the credibility and effectiveness of a regulatory 
framework can vary with a country’s political and social institutions. Good governance is 
believed to be the key to improve institutions of regulation by more effective conflict 
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management and sophisticated contract enforcement regimes. Bergara et al. (1998), based 
on the framework developed by Levy and Spiller (1996), analysed the impact of political 
institutions and government commitment on electric utility performance. One of the main 
conclusions of the study is that even in the face of some political instability, the existence 
of independent institutions, and a professional and competent judiciary can insure better 
policy stability even in developing countries (ceteris paribus). 
 
3.  The Design of Regulatory Institutions 
 
Regulation can be carried out by a variety of bodies, viz. Government ministries, 
independent regulators, or in courts of law. Hence, the nature of the regulating institutions 
can affect not merely the style of regulation and the strategies employed but also the 
success with which regulatory ends are achieved. There are some common elements that 
designers of regulatory agencies need to address. Note that the examples used in this 
section are derived from the survey results, unless otherwise stated. They all refer to data as 
at December 2000. 
 
3.1. The Scope of Regulatory Activity 
 
Governments must decide on the breadth of regulatory authority. In principle, regulatory 
authorities can be industry-specific with separate agencies for gas, water, electricity, and so 
on - as in Bolivia, Israel, Kenya and the Russian Federation. They can be sector-specific 
with separate agencies for groups of related industries, such as for gas and electricity 
combined - as in the UK, Sudan and Swaziland. Or they can be multi-sectoral with a single 
regulatory agency for all or most infrastructure sectors - as in state-level regulators in the 
United States and national regulators in The Bahamas, Eritrea, and Gambia.  
 
In principle, a multi-sectoral agency offers advantages over the alternatives, especially for 
small and resource scarce developing countries. It can also be argued that they reduce the 
risks of regulatory capture by the industry. Sectoral or multi-sectoral regulators pool 
                                                          
1
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regulatory resources (regulatory economists and lawyers, for example) and also save on 
high regulatory costs.  However, multi-sectoral regulators also have some potential 
disadvantages, e.g. on reduced industry knowledge and understanding.  In addition, the 
political undermining of a single multi-sectoral regulator may be easier.  Indeed, political 
or company capture of a single multi-sectoral regulator is likely to be more damaging than 
for one of a number of separate regulators.   
 
3.2. Independence and Accountability 
 
Independence and professionalism imply a more secure framework for providing stable and 
predictable regulation. Many electricity/energy regulatory institutions in developing 
countries such as Gambia or Trinidad and Tobago have moved away from direct central 
government funding to licence fees or levies on regulated companies or consumers.  
 
Another aspect of regulatory independence is over the choice of an independent 
remuneration scale, and the ability of the regulatory institution to recruit staff without any 
interference from the government. This may involve the freedom to move away from a 
civil service pay scale. 
 
 
3.3. Regulatory Design in Developed Countries 
 
The record of OECD economies in regulatory reform is mixed. Different economies have 
progressed at a different pace, with the United Kingdom and Norway probably the 
pathfinders. The United States has assumed a heterogeneous regulatory approach based on 
a Federal Regulatory Commissions for inter-state issues (based on legislation originating in 
the Federal Power Act of 1935) with multi-sector regulatory commissions in each state 
following a variety of approaches (for instance the California Public Utilities Commission 
largely originates from the state’s Public Utilities Act of 1912).  
 
The UK electricity and gas regulator, Ofgem, is likely to continue with high (but falling) 
staff levels as is evident from the recently published corporate plan (Ofgem, 2002). 
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Ofgem’s total number of professional staff employed, of 197, as at year 2000 seems very 
large from a developing country perspective. However, there are some regulators in our 
sample with staff numbers far exceeding this level. For instance, the multi-sectoral Public 
Utilities Commission of California employs more than 600 professional staff, although it 
regulates only about half the number of customers as Ofgem (although it does regulate 
more sectors).  
 
There is a considerable amount of variation in the design and scope of regulation in 
developed countries, and there is a tendency for regulation to become more complex 
involving network access and pricing issues. In contrast, in many small developing 
countries regulation is usually more basic and often limited to regulating final retail tariffs 
(e.g. Nigeria). For developing countries, the design and limited scope of regulation is, in 
practice, largely determined by the restricted supply of trained manpower and/or low 
budget allocations form the government. 
 
 
3.4. The Case of Developing Countries 
 
Developing countries have been late entrants in the move toward liberalisation, but are 
quickly catching up. Indeed, some countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, 
such as Argentina, El Salvador, Peru and Mexico, have in recent years made attempts (or 
are currently trying) to implement major economic deregulation initiatives in electricity and 
other utility service industries, although many do not seem to have had an easy ride due, 
not least, to difficult macroeconomic conditions. 
 
For developing countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, the 
issue of the supply of sufficient regulatory experts can be critical as to whether regulation 
can, in practice, effectively be separated from government policy and from company 
management (i.e. can avoid the twin dangers of ministerial interference and regulatory 
capture). If it cannot be so separated, the question then arises as to the sustainability of 
unbundled, commercialised and privatised provision of telecom, electricity and other 
infrastructure services (Stern, 2001).  
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Most small developing countries have very few professional staff to support an effective 
regulatory institution e.g. because of severe competition over scarce human resources. 
Hence, Kenya, Namibia and Uganda all have fewer than 10 professional staff each in their 
multi-sector regulatory institutions. Low income and small countries have less choice both 
on the structure and on the form of regulation as they are more likely to be resource-
constrained, particularly in professional human capital.  In consequence, low income and 
small developing countries are more likely – at least in principle – to benefit from multi-
sectoral institutions for utility regulation. 
 
4. Model Specification 
4.1. General Issues in Modelling Human Resource Requirements 
 
The core concept of our model is summarised in Figure 1. Here, we briefly explain the 
‘links’ in the diagram.  
 
Links numbers 1 and 2 represent the relationships between the number of locally available 
professional staff and foreign consultants and non-professional staff. In a number of 
countries, foreign professionals substitute for short-term scarce local capability (e.g. 
Botswana.). It may also happen that, in many developing countries, cheaper non-
professionals are substituted for professionals (e.g. Sudan).  (Note that substitution 
possibilities are limited, particularly for decision-making regulatory bodies, which have to 
follow defined legal processes). 
 
Link number 3 represents the major cost drivers of the regulatory agency. The agency is 
accountable to the consumers, and has to balance their interest against the two other 
groups, viz., producers and the government.  
 
The size of the regulatory agency in terms of total staff numbers is primarily a function of 
the size of the two main groups (customers and regulated companies), via their basic 
characteristics (such as the actual amount of product or services sold, or the degree of 
market power held by the regulated companies). For instance, it is clear that the larger the 
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number of consumers, the larger will be the number of staff needed by the regulatory 
institution. This is explained by the very nature of regulatory activity e.g. in handling 
consumer concerns and complaints.  
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Figure 1:  Schematic Presentation of Regulatory Activity 
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The size of the regulatory agency may be inversely related to the number of companies (due 
to competition in networks, or probably due to more viable use of incentive regulation). 
However, more regulated companies also usually imply that the regulator has more licences 
to deal with, more analyses of companies’ performance and accounts, and greater effort is 
likely to be required to implement incentive regulation. In addition, greater regulatory 
complexity (e.g. arising from regulation of competitive companies using monopoly 
networks or more interconnected regional franchise companies) is also likely to increase 
the expected number of staff, particularly professional staff.  The cross-section analysis in 
this paper provides only tentative conclusions on this issue. (See Section 6 below.)   
 
Our paper also focuses on number of electricity companies regulated; unfortunately we do 
not have information regarding non-electricity businesses that are also regulated (by the 
multi-sectoral regulators in our cross-section of countries) and which also use scarce 
professional resources.  
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Link number 4 in Figure 1 relates to the perceived essential characteristics of the regulatory 
agency as explained in section 2.1 above. We have deliberately excluded a detailed 
description of the quantity and quality of the output of the regulatory agency since we only 
aim at estimating the human input requirement of the regulatory institution relative to the 
complexity and size of the system being regulated. 
 
The operation of regulation lies within the country’s broad economic, social and regulatory 
environment. The operating (economic and regulatory) environment influences the extent 
to which the six ‘essential characteristics’ (discussed in section 2) are taken into 
consideration at the design stage. The operating environment also impacts on the whole 
process of regulation, from the way that staff recruitment is conducted to the manner in 
which customer complaints are actually addressed.  
 
4.2. The Model 
 
The schematic presentation in section 4.1 above allows us to write a model of staff as 
follows: 
 
(1) Staffi = f (System Complexity, Economic Environment, Regulatory Environment, 
where, Staffi, = total number of staff (or professional staff) employed in the electricity 
regulator in Country i  and 
(2) System Complexity = gi (Number of Customers, Number and Size of Companies, Number 
of Sectors Regulated)  
(3) Economic Environment = hi (Per Capita GDP, Supply of highly educated labour) 
(4) Regulatory Environment = ii (Corruption level, Governance, Age of agency, Funding 
Source) 
 
In Table 1, we provide a list of variables derived from equations 1-4 above. In the next 
section we explain each group of variables and provide some explanation on the expected 
sign of each coefficient in the list of variables used in our regression analyses. 
 
Table 1: Variable List 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE Expected 
Sign of 
STAFF 
Expected 
sign of 
PROF 
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Dependent Variables 
STAFF Total number of staff employed in regulatory institution Survey   
PROF Number of professional staff in regulatory institution Survey   
System Complexity 
NCUSMN Number of customers (in million) Survey + + 
NCOMP Number of regulated companies  Survey 
follow-up  
+ + or ? 
GCAP Generating capacity (MW) Survey + or ? + or ? 
SECTORS Number of sectors regulated by the agency  Survey + + 
SSMN Units supplied (million) MWh (units sold in case supplied 
not reported) 
Survey + + 
Economic Environment 
PCGDP GDP per capita at 2000 constant dollars WDI2 + + 
POP Population Size (Million) WDI + + 
POSTSEC Percentage attaining  tertiary level 
qualifications3(TERTED) times population size 
UNESCO ? + 
Regulatory Environment 
CORRUPT Corruption index (10 = highly clean, 0 = highly corrupt) Transparency 
International 
? ? 
REGENV Index of regulatory environment Kauffman 
(1999)  
? ? 
CSERV Dummy variable (civil service pay=1, otherwise=0) Survey + 
− or ? 
FUNDING Source of finance of the regulatory institution: dummy 
(government or central budget funding=0, otherwise = 1) 
Survey + or ? + 
ORGTYPE Organisation type dummy (autonomous=1, otherwise=0) Survey 
− 
+ or ? 
REGTYPE Dummy (performance-based=1 ; otherwise=0) Survey ? ? 
JURISD Dummy variable (national jurisdiction = 1, provincial=0) Survey + + 
YRS No. of years (to survey date) since electricity/regulatory 
Act was passed 
DummyY1 (YRS < 2 = 1, otherwise=0) 
DummyY2 (2 ≤YRS ≤ 5 = 1; otherwise = 0) 
DummyY3 (5 < YRS ≤ 10 = 1; otherwise = 0) 
DummyY4 (YRS > 10 = 1; otherwise = 0) 
Survey + + or ? 
Interaction and Other Variables 
SECTNCUS NCUSMN*NSECTORS Survey + + 
DENSE SSMN/NCUSMN Survey ? ? 
 
4.2.1. System Complexity 
 
We would expect system complexity to be the main direct driver of staff numbers. The 
complexity variables also define the scale or size effect on regulatory staff. We might 
expect there to be evidence of substantial fixed cost effects and related economies of scale 
in regulatory agencies – these will particularly penalise small developing countries. To 
                                                          
2
 World Development Indicators of the World Bank downloaded from World Bank’s Web Site 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/. 
3
 Percentage of children starting primary school who eventually attain Grade 5 (UNESCO, 1999). 
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reduce multi-collinearity between size variables (given that number of customers is usually 
highly correlated with the units supplied or with generation capacity), we identify only four 
size variables (or at least two, to proxy for complexity) and then use some interaction 
variables.  
 
4.2.2. Economic Environment 
 
We would expect the level of per capita income (PCGDP) and population (POP) to be 
positively correlated with number of regulatory staff and both the supply and demand for 
regulation is increasing in these variables. However the sign on the percentage in post-
secondary education (POSTSEC) is difficult to predict.  On the one hand, more effective 
regulation may yield higher economic returns in low-income countries – particularly where 
there is a poorly educated and possibly more corrupt society; but, conversely, there are 
more limited financial resources to employ professional staff and many competing (and 
high-paying) uses for such staff  
 
4.2.3. Regulatory Environment 
 
The general regulatory environment in a country can impact on the way regulatory 
institutions are initially designed. The social environment and general institutional 
endowment of the country can also significantly affect the quality and commitment of staff 
in regulatory institutions. CORRUPT (index of government corruption) is an indicator of 
the distortion of economic and financial incentives which reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through 
patronage rather than ability, and it introduces instability into the political process. The 
Corruption index ranges from 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
Similarly, the efficiency and integrity of the regulatory environment (REGENV) 
determines the ability of the regulatory body to rely on impartial and independent 
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recruitment and training. It also defines to a considerable extent the state of governance of 
the country. The Index used is from Kauffman et al. (1999)4. 
 
The use or otherwise of civil service pay scales (CSERV), the source of funding 
(FUNDING) and its autonomy or otherwise from government control (ORGTYPE) relate 
to the extent to which the regulatory agency is constrained directly or indirectly by central 
government. We might expect non-civil service salary scale, non-government funded, 
autonomous regulators to have more freedom to recruit extra staff.  
 
The type of regulation (REGTYPE) employed by a regulator relates to its degree of 
sophistication. We assume that price-cap (or any variant of a performance-based incentive 
regulation) is, in principle, superior to rate of return regulation, following for example, 
Braeutigam and Panzar (1993). However, whether performance-based regulation requires 
more or fewer regulatory staff is not obvious in the literature, but there is a feeling that it 
would require a higher proportion of professionally qualified ones.  For this reason, small 
and low-income countries with limited regulatory resources are sometimes advised to avoid 
high-powered incentive regulation (see Levy and Spiller, 1996). 
 
An important variable of interest in our analysis is the number of years since an electricity 
Act was passed or regulatory legislation came into force that legitimised the existence of 
the regulatory institution. In Table 1, this is described by the variable YRS and it is used as 
an indication of the organic growth structure of regulatory institutions. We believe that the 
number of years is directly related to the level of staff employed, given that regulation 
become more entrenched and the scope of regulatory functions tends to become larger over 
time, perhaps because of ‘regulatory creep’ (or,  for newly established regulatory agencies, 
success in building up the agency and in recruitment. 
 
4.3 Estimation of the model 
 
                                                          
4
 www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm is the source of the data from which it was downloaded. 
It gives aggregated indices based on 6 indices of governance. The governance indicators reported reflect the 
statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large number of survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organisations, commercial risk rating 
agencies, and think-tanks during 1997 and 1998. REGENV is measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 
2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. 
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In the absence of a priori information on the functional form of the cost function for 
regulation we estimate equation (1) above using a translog functional form (following 
Christensen et al., 1971). This involves using a log-log specification, including squares of 
the system complexity and economic environment variables. Such a specification assumes 
a reasonably flexible functional form, which is appropriate given the complex nature of the 
underlying production function. In addition, this specification corresponds to the standard 
functional form for estimating cost functions.  Our model is best thought of as providing a 
regulatory cost function for countries wishing to establish an electricity industry with 
substantial elements of private finance/investment and/or a significant degree of 
competition in generation or supply. 
 
We estimate separate equations with (natural log of): (a) STAFF and (b) PROF as 
dependent variables. In section 6 we denote the log variables with the prefix L. 
 
We might expect that the coefficient estimates and key elasticities may well be different for 
developed from those for developing countries. Thus, we estimate separate cost equations 
for the full sample and for each of the sub-samples of developed and developing countries. 
 
5.  Data  
 
A one-page postal questionnaire survey was used to collect the original data for the study. 
This was carried out in two phases: the first series was carried out in February 2001 
administered on 150 countries. 54 replies were received (33% response rate), which may be 
considered good for this type of primary data collection by post. There were telephone 
follow-ups to the questionnaires but most countries were unable to provide additional 
information, except on the number of companies regulated. 
 
A second attempt at carrying out a similar survey was made in February through March 
2002. A total of 30 questionnaires sent out mainly by e-mail to US public utilities 
commissions, regulatory institutions in Eastern European, South Africa and Tasmania, 
returned 8 positive replies. Other data had to be collected from additional phone follow-ups 
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and Internet searches, and also some additional data on regulators published in World Bank 
(2001). 
 
We finally obtained usable data for 60 countries (see Appendix 1). There are important 
issues of data quality5. Even after cross-checking of some of the responses, there still 
remains some doubt on some of them. (For instance, Cambodia’s total of 105 staff seems 
very large, though this could genuinely reflect a large number of non-core service staff.)  In 
addition, it seems that countries vary in terms of the implicit skill levels used in the 
definition of “professional” when reporting their numbers of professional staff.  These 
imply that both the results and inferences from the reported empirical estimates should be 
treated with some degree of caution given the possible idiosyncratic interpretation of some 
of the questions in the survey questionnaire. 
 
Table 2 below provides some descriptive statistics comparing developing and developed 
countries. Appendix 1 lists the full dataset. 
 
For the purpose of our analyses, developing countries include all the countries with a per 
capita GDP of less than US$ 4,300 in 2001, which conforms to World Bank definitions 
(WDI, several years). This allows us to have a split of the overall sample into two nearly 
balanced samples of 34 developed countries and 26 developing ones (see Appendix 1). The 
high mean population size for developing countries is due to the inclusion of India in the 
sample.  
 
A quick inspection of the summary statistics indicates, not surprisingly, a large gap 
between developing and developed countries, with the latter having higher mean 
professional and total staff numbers (though similar median staff numbers) and also having 
much larger electric systems. Variables relating to both the regulatory and economic 
environment also indicate a significant difference between the two groups, with developed 
                                                          
5
 The reported number of companies regulated by regulatory institutions is assumed to be for electricity 
businesses only (as per the questionnaire requirement). There is no guarantee that the reported figures are 
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countries indicating a both a less corrupt regulatory environment as well as a longer time 
period of existence of utility regulatory institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
accurate and to what extent the companies are actually subject to regulation. Furthermore, we do not have the 
number of non-electricity companies regulated. 
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We note here that the average number of sectors regulated by the agencies in developing is 
2.0 whereas it is 3.0 for developed countries (though the developed country average is 
increased by the presence of several state level US regulators with a large number of 
sectors regulated). This is counter to our expectations and to standard regulatory policy 
advice. It suggests that the developing countries may not be making best use of multi-
sector regulators.  We discuss this issue further in Sections 6 and 7. 
 
Given the similar median staff numbers in developing and developed countries combined 
with the lower median number of sectors regulated and customer numbers for developing 
countries, Table 2 suggests that the median number of staff per million customers per 
sector regulated is substantially higher for the 26 developing countries in the dataset than it 
is for the 34 developed countries in the dataset. This is strongly indicative of the possibility 
that there may be significant fixed costs to regulation which developing economies may not 
be able to mitigate.  We discuss this further in Section 6 below. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Preliminary Data Analysis 
Before presenting our regression analysis of the determinants of costs it is useful to 
examine some of the simple staff per million customers per sector ratios for the sample 
countries. This allows us to take a preliminary view on whether there are any significant 
differences between the characteristics of regulatory agencies in developed and developing 
countries.  
 
Table 3 shows that most developing countries have a very high ratio of STAFF (and 
PROF) per customer per number of regulated sectors.  
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Table 3: Staff per Regulated Customers per Number of Sectors Regulated  
 
Developed Countries 
 Developing Countries 
 
Total Staff 
per million 
customers 
per sector 
regulated 
Professional 
Staff per 
million 
customers per 
sector 
regulated  
Total Staff 
per million 
customers 
per sector 
regulated 
Professional 
Staff per 
million 
customers 
per sector 
regulated 
Argentina 11.49 5.75Albania 21.31 6.56 
Australia-IPART 4.17 2.92Armenia 20.39 16.86 
Australia-Tasmania 17.49 13.45Bolivia 49.67 39.74 
Australia-Victoria 3.10 0.55Cambodia 774.98 708.56 
Austria 13.00 7.00Costa Rica 21.44 12.86 
Barbados 49.35 19.74Dominican Republic 29.78 20.84 
Belgium 4.08 2.91Ecuador 23.69 15.11 
BRAZIL-Sao Paulo 2.54 1.53El Salvador 26.98 17.67 
Canada_NEB 4.59 1.57Etiopía 45.26 22.63 
Canada_Newfoundland 13.02 7.01Grenada 64.63 53.86 
Canada_OEB 18.33 10.00India_CERC 0.32 0.14 
Czech Republic 4.42 3.09India_Orissa 1.51 0.69 
Denmark 29.82 20.81Jamaica 19.56 13.27 
Hawaii 19.57 10.08Kenya 49.44 17.80 
Hong Kong 2.92 2.50Lithuania 7.95 6.82 
Hungary 5.75 5.29Malaysia 13.64 3.82 
Ireland 18.57 8.17Namibia 98.77 43.21 
Israel 9.66 6.28Nicaragua 103.56 74.80 
Mexico 3.65 2.09Nigeria 16.95 7.26 
Netherlands 17.49 15.40Peru 15.21 10.65 
Northern Ireland 5.07 3.49Philippines 29.20 22.07 
Portugal 9.45 7.37Poland 3.77 3.07 
Spain 2.90 1.95Romania 3.58 3.28 
Sweden 2.83 2.36Russia 3.80 3.80 
The Bahamas 42.23 16.24Sudan 8.33 2.78 
Trinidad and Tobago 13.73 8.45Uganda 70.18 29.24 
United Kingdom 6.27 3.75   
USA-California 12.22 7.75   
USA-Delaware 12.84 10.63   
USA-Florida 9.10 6.60   
USA-Kansas 31.34 7.39   
USA-New York 98.86 74.15   
USA-North Carolina 2.35 0.97   
USA-Wisconsin 22.02 14.88   
Mean 15.42 9.18 58.61 44.51 
Standard Error 3.19 2.17 29.18 26.79 
Median 10.58 6.80 21.37 14.19 
Minimum 2.35 0.55 0.32 0.14 
Maximum 98.86 74.15 774.98 708.56 
 
 
This suggests that small developing countries do suffer from a high ‘fixed cost’ element in 
regulation. Indeed many developing countries have been reluctant to set up independent 
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electricity sector regulators precisely because of the high fixed costs of regulation relative 
to the small size of their electricity sectors. 
 
A major reason for the high staff per customer per regulated sector ratio in developing 
countries is their much smaller level of connections as reflected in the low number of 
electricity customers relative to population. Indeed it is striking that the summary statistics 
for staff per population per regulated sector show almost identical median values when 
comparing the developing and developed country samples (see Table 4).  However, Table 4 
also shows the particular difficulties faced by small developing countries (viz Grenada and 
Namibia). 
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Table 4: Staff per Population Size per Number of Sectors Regulated 
 Developed Countries  Developing Countries 
 
Total Staff 
per million 
population 
per sector 
regulated
Professional 
Staff per 
million 
population 
per sector 
regulated 
Total Staff 
per million 
population 
per sector 
regulated
Professional 
Staff per 
million 
population 
per sector 
regulated 
Argentina 3.55 1.78 Albania 3.85 1.19 
Australia-IPART 1.91 1.34 Armenia 4.55 3.76 
Australia-Tasmania 9.21 7.09 Bolivia 6.14 4.92 
Australia-Victoria 1.40 0.25 Cambodia 8.93 8.17 
Austria 6.43 3.46 Costa Rica 6.27 3.76 
Barbados 18.73 7.49 Dominican Republic 3.58 2.51 
Belgium 1.71 1.22 Ecuador 4.67 2.98 
BRAZIL-Sao Paulo 0.18 0.11 El Salvador 4.71 3.09 
Canada_NEB 2.30 0.79 Etiopía 0.41 0.21 
Canada_Newfoundland 0.11 0.06 Grenada 20.62 17.18 
Canada_OEB 1.80 0.98 India_CERC 0.06 0.03 
Czech Republic 2.37 1.65 India_Orissa 1.20 0.54 
Denmark 16.59 11.58 Jamaica 3.59 2.44 
Hawaii 6.25 3.22 Kenya 0.85 0.31 
Hong Kong 1.04 0.89 Lithuania 2.84 2.43 
Hungary 2.91 2.68 Malaysia 3.30 0.92 
Ireland 3.33 1.47 Namibia 9.41 4.12 
Israel 3.28 2.13 Nicaragua 9.15 6.61 
Mexico 0.81 0.47 Nigeria 1.13 0.48 
Netherlands 0.79 0.70 Peru 1.98 1.39 
Northern Ireland 4.73 3.25 Philippines 3.42 2.59 
Portugal 5.01 3.90 Poland 1.47 1.20 
Spain 1.56 1.05 Romania 1.34 1.22 
Sweden 1.69 1.41 Russia 0.14 0.14 
The Bahamas 14.44 5.56 Sudan 0.17 0.06 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.35 2.06 Uganda 0.56 0.23 
United Kingdom 2.76 1.66    
USA-California 4.65 2.95    
USA-Delaware 6.16 5.10    
USA-Florida 4.62 3.35    
USA-Kansas 15.77 3.72    
USA-New York 6.32 4.74    
USA-North Carolina 1.20 0.50    
USA-Wisconsin 8.62 5.83    
Mean 4.87 2.78  4.01 2.79 
Standard Error 0.83 0.43  0.86 0.71 
Median 3.30 1.92  3.36 1.91 
Minimum 0.11 0.06  0.06 0.03 
Maximum 18.73 11.58  20.62 17.18 
 
 
The fixed cost element is well illustrated if we plot the relationship between staff per 
million customers per sector regulated against number of customers. This effectively plots 
out the average cost curve for regulation. Figures 2 and 3 give the results of this exercise 
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for total staff and professional staff. We can see that there is an average cost curve6 for the 
full sample that slopes downwards (hence a high fixed cost element) and that developing 
countries are concentrated in the relatively steep portion of the curve (indeed mostly lie 
above the fitted line). 
 
Figure 2: Average Regulatory Cost (Total Staff) 
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6
 The Lowess method (from SPSS software package) is used to fit the relevant curves in Figures 2 through 5. 
This method uses an iterative locally weighted least-squares method to fit a curve to a set of points. Our 
curves fit 90% of data points based on 3 iterations. 
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Figure 3: Average Regulatory Cost (Professional Staff) 
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We can further illustrate the relative human resource burden that regulation puts on a 
human resource poor developing country by examining the relationship between staff 
numbers per sector divided by  population times percentage in post-secondary education 
(i.e. Staffi/NSECTORS/POSTSEC) and customer numbers. This gives us a measure of the 
size of the regulatory agency relative to the pool of qualified staff. Figures 4 and 5 plot the 
results of this exercise for total staff and professional staff7. Once again we can see that 
there is high fixed resource burden - illustrated by the downward sloping nature of the 
fitted curve - and that developing countries are concentrated in the relatively steep portion 
of the curve (and mostly lie above the fitted line). 
 
                                                          
7
 We normalise the staff human resource burden figures relative to their respective mean values. 
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Figure 4: Human Resource Burden (Total Staff) 
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Figure 5: Human Resource Burden (Professional Staff) 
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6.2. Regression Results for Total Numbers of Regulatory Staff  
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Our regression models were run using heteroscedastic-corrected (HCSE) ordinary least 
squares (OLS). In Table 5 we present the results of regression analyses of (log of) total 
staff (STAFF), as defined in equations (1) to (4) in section 4.2 above, based on the full 
sample of 60 utility regulatory institutions. Model S1 reports our preferred equation for the 
full sample of 60 countries, Model S2 the preferred equation for the 34 developed countries 
and Model S3 is the regression of the functional form in Model S2 for 26 developing 
countries, and the preferred equation for these developing countries is given by Model S4. 
 
 27
Table 5: Regression Results for Log of Total Number of Staff Employed by Regulatory Institutions  
LSTAFF Model S1 Model S2 Model S3 Model S4 
Number of Observations 
60 
Countries 
34 Developed 
Countries 
26 Developing 
Countries 
26 Developing 
Countries 
(Constant) 
-11.8156 
(9.2053) 
1.9342 
(3.3250) 
-2.0061 
(2.2997) 
1.1358 
(1.1665) 
LNCUSMN 
2.4335* 
(1.4321) 
0.4713*** 
(0.1440) 
0.2786 
(0.1911)  
LNCUSMN2 
-0.0697 
(0.0460)   
0.0134** 
(0.0045) 
LNCOMP 
0.4626*** 
(0.1516) 
0.4492** 
(0.2133) 
-0.0289 
(0.2470)  
LNCOMP2 
-0.0508** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0600* 
(0.0314) 
0.0356 
(0.0394) 
0.0196 
(0.0132) 
LGENCAP  
-1.3598* 
(0.7043) 
0.6244 
(0.6265)  
LGENCAP2 
-0.0199** 
(0.0095) 
0.0738* 
(0.0404) 
-0.0500 
(0.0401) 
-0.0285*** 
(0.0094) 
LSECTORS 
-2.5313* 
(1.4185) 
0.5081** 
(0.2255) 
0.2316 
(0.2864) 
-6.4476*** 
(2.0744) 
LPCGDP 
-0.2211** 
(0.1085)    
LPOSTSEC 
-0.7197 
(0.5422)    
LPOSTSEC2 
0.0580 
(0.0358) 
0.0107 
(0.0086) 
0.0039 
(0.0165)  
REGENV 
0.8322** 
(0.3167)    
CSERV    
-0.3923 
(0.2454) 
FUNDING  
0.3938 
(0.2612) 
-0.5855 
(0.4086) 
-0.6926** 
(0.2959) 
ORGTYPE 
-0.6432*** 
(0.2053) 
-1.0143*** 
(0.2629) 
0.1480 
(0.4582)  
REGTYPE 
-0.1730* 
(0.0921)    
JURISD    
2.3861** 
(0.9168) 
DummyY2    
0.4499 
(0.3134) 
DummyY3    
0.6676* 
(0.3667) 
DummyY4    
1.7419*** 
(0.4483) 
LSECTNCUS✝ 
0.2149** 
(0.0987)   
0.4670*** 
(0.1493) 
LNDENSE    
-0.4627* 
(0.2083) 
R2 0.7441 0.8467 0.6006 0.8522 
R2 Adjusted 0.6718 0.7892 0.3760 0.7157 
F (.,.) 
10.2901*** 
(13,59) 
14.7284*** 
(9,33) 
2.6738** 
(9,25) 
6.2443*** 
(12,25) 
✝
 LSECTNCUS=LSECTORS*LNCUSMN 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%, Standard error in parentheses. 
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As is apparent in Table 5, a modified translog-cost equation is used whereby the dependent 
variable and most explanatory variables are in natural logs. Squared values of explanatory 
variables are also used together with one log-log interaction variable.  
 
Model S1 is our preferred regression equation for the full sample with the highest R-bar 
squared value and is also the result of stepwise regression (whereby each variable with the 
lowest t-value was successively rejected until we ended up with few variables that explain 
nearly the same amount variation in the dependent variable LSTAFF). 
 
In Model S1, the two important size variables (number of customers and the number of 
regulated companies) have the expected positive signs and are also significant. The 
‘economic environment’ variable per capita GDP has a negative sign indicating that richer 
countries all being equal have lower staff numbers (perhaps due to greater efficiency).  The 
‘regulatory environment’ variable REGENV is also statistically significant implying that a 
less corrupt regulatory environment is associated with more staff. ORGTYPE and 
REGTYPE are significant and have negative signs. This indicates that autonomous 
regulatory institutions with performance-based regulation tend to have fewer staff. Model 
S1 has an R2 of 74% (and adjusted value of 67%) and is a relatively good fit (as reflected in 
the F Value). 
 
Model S2, is the best fitting equation for developed countries only. It suggests that the 
nature of the relationship between the system complexity, economic environment, and 
regulatory environment, and total staff employed is different from what the above results 
have suggested so far. Installed capacity is a more influential variable in the model 
compared to model S1. The number of sectors regulated (SECTORS) is also significant 
and positive at 1%, although this seems primarily to be due to the large multi-sectoral 
regulators in the United States.  FUNDING has a positive coefficient (although not 
statistically significant) suggesting that licence fee or levy funding increases staff numbers. 
ORGTYPE is significant but has a negative sign. This suggests that, in developed 
countries, licence fee or levy funded non-autonomous regulators have more staff than 
licence fee or levy funded autonomous regulators.  
 
Model S2 has an adjusted-R2 of 79% (and an F(9,33) value of 14.7). This shows not only a 
good fit – and superior to the larger 60 country sample - but also indicates the extent to 
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which the variability in data is increased when the developing country sample is combined 
with the developed country sample.   
 
These results strongly suggest a well-determined model for staff numbers in developed 
countries and a relatively less well-determined model for staff numbers in developing 
countries.  This is confirmed in the results for Models S3 and S4 reported and also for the 
regression results for professional staff reported below.  
 
Model S3, estimates the regression equation for developing countries only using the 
functional form of S2. This allows differences between the shapes of the cost functions to 
be easily observed. The resulting equation confirms the significant difference in the nature 
of the regulatory cost function between developed and developing countries. The adjusted-
R2 is lower at 38%, indicating much greater variance around the estimated cost function, 
and the F(9,25) value is only 2.7 and none of the individual variables is significant even at 
the 10% level. The parameter values are also significantly different between S2 and S3. For 
instance, looking at the size variable LNCUSMN the difference in the parameter values is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (using a one tailed t test).  
 
Model S4 represents the best unrestricted equation for developing countries. This 
demonstrates clearly the point about significant differences between the regulatory cost 
functions between the two samples.  S4 is very different from S3 but fits the data much 
better as shown in an adjusted-R2 of 72% and an F(12,25) value of 6.2.  However, the only 
significant system complexity coefficients are for (the square of) generation capacity and 
the number of regulated sectors.  The significant coefficient on JURISD arises at least in 
part from the large relative size of the Indian Federal regulator as against the State 
regulators. Finally, S4 shows that the age of the regulatory agency has a substantial impact 
on the number of staff employed in developing country electricity regulators – much more 
than for developed countries. 
 
An interesting difference between S2 and S4 exist in the sign of the parameter on the 
FUNDING and ORGTYPE dummies. This indicates that regulatory institutions in 
developing countries with licence fee or levy funding and which are not autonomous of 
government have fewer staff (in contrast to the result for developed countries). 
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We performed a number of tests of the differences in functional form of the cost functions 
faced by developed and developing countries. These included investigation of the 
elasticities of staff numbers with respect to numbers of customers and number of units 
distributed. The most directly comparable equations are S2 and S3 in this regard. These 
indicate that the elasticity at median values for developing countries with respect to 
customer numbers is 0.47 using S2 and 0.28 using S3. However this difference is not 
statistically significant (given the large amount of noise in the data). More telling however 
are the very significant differences in the predicted total staff numbers for the sample of 
developing countries using equations S2 and S4. These predictions are reported in 
Appendix 3.8 
6.3. Regression Results for Numbers of Professional Staff 
 
In this section we follow the same principles as in the previous section 6.2, but we analyse 
the number of professional staff employed by regulatory institutions (PROF) and its 
determinants. Table 6 presents the results. 
 
                                                          
8
 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient indicates a very low correlations between the predicted values 
using S2 and S4 (0.149); this value is not significantly different from zero. 
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Table 6: Regression Results for the Log of Professional Staff Employed by Regulatory Institutions 
LPROF Model P1 Model P2 Model P3 Model P4 
Number of 
Observations 
60 
Countries  
34 Developed 
Countries 
26 Developing 
Countries 
26 Developing 
Countries 
(Constant) 
-18.8667* 
(11.0914) 
-0.5136 
(3.5276) 
3.5874 
(3.0849) 
5.4588 
(7.8526) 
LNCUSMN 
3.5840** 
(1.7284) 
0.5601** 
(0.2285) 
0.2415 
(0.2001)  
LNCUSMN2 
-0.1081* 
(0.0553)   
0.0143* 
(0.0067) 
LNCOMP 
0.4010** 
(0.1798)   
-0.2718 
(0.2378) 
LNCOMP2 
-0.0398 
(0.0277)   
0.0969** 
(0.0357) 
LGENCAP  
-1.4255 
(0.9366) 
-0.8176 
(0.7562) 
1.2855** 
(0.5101) 
LGENCAP2 
-0.0169 
(0.0114) 
0.1042* 
(0.0536) 
0.0371 
(0.0402) 
-0.1044** 
(0.0351) 
LSECTORS 
-1.7684 
(1.6762) 
3.2496 
(2.5219) 
-5.6442* 
(2.9687)  
LPCGDP 
-0.3236** 
(0.1277)   
-3.3914 
(2.5342) 
LPCGDP2    
0.2608 
(0.1836) 
LPOSTSEC 
-1.1438* 
(0.6578)    
LPOSTSEC2 
0.0835* 
(0.0434)    
REGENV 
1.2000*** 
(0.3755)    
CSERV    
-0.9495*** 
(0.3062) 
FUNDING  
0.8183*** 
(0.2567) 
-0.8827* 
(0.4851) 
-0.9493** 
(0.3921) 
ORGTYPE 
-0.6715*** 
(0.2447) 
-1.2898*** 
(0.2807) 
0.9755** 
(0.4506)  
REGTYPE 
-0.1552 
(0.1087)    
JURISD    
3.4106** 
(1.1590) 
DummyY2 
0.3497 
(0.2490)   
0.9865** 
(0.4509) 
DummyY3    
1.0387* 
(0.5526) 
DummyY4  
-0.4307 
(0.2793) 
0.7470 
(0.5732) 
1.7040* 
(0.5719) 
LSECTNCUS 
0.1626 
(0.1164) 
-0.2004 
(0.1708) 
0.4275* 
(0.2090)  
LDENSE    
-0.7043* 
(0.3381) 
R2 0.6960 0.8388 0.5920 0.8613 
R2 Adjusted 0.6014 0.7872 0.4000 0.6847 
F (.,.) 
7.3583*** 
(14,59) 
16.2551*** 
(8,33) 
3.0836** 
(8,25) 
4.8773*** 
(14,25) 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%, Standard error in parentheses. 
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Model P1 is the preferred equation for the (log of) professional employment in electricity 
regulation, based on the sample of 60 regulators. Model P2 presents the result of the same 
exercise using the sample of developed countries and Model P3 applies the P2 functional 
form to generate results for our developing country sample. Model P4 represents the best 
fit for the developing country data without restricting the choice of variables in the 
equation. 
 
The estimated coefficients on both the number of customers and the number of companies 
have the expected positive signs and are statistically significant in Model P1. While system 
complexity variables explain a considerable amount of variation in the number of total 
professional staff employed, ORGTYPE is also a significant explanatory variable with a 
negative parameter sign, implying that (cet par) autonomous regulators have fewer 
professional staff.  This somewhat surprising result reflects that for our analysis of total 
staff numbers. 
 
Model P2 gives another well fitting equation for developed countries. This indicates that 
the number of sectors and number of customers have the expected positive impact on 
professional staff. However, the number of companies is not statistically significant in P2.  
In general, the pattern of significant dummy variables is similar to the pattern observed in 
the overall staff equation S2. 
 
Comparing Model P3, for developing countries, with Model P2, we see that once again 
there are major differences in the cost functions between developed and developing 
countries. Model P3 fits the data relatively poorly (adjusted-R2 of 40% and an F(8,25) of only 
3.08) compared to Model P2 (adjusted-R2 of 79% and an F(8,33) of 16.3). The nature of the 
estimated cost function also differs substantially.  For instance, there is a significant 
difference between the parameter value on LNCUSMN in P2 and P3, similar to the result 
we found in our analysis of total staff. 
 
Model P4 confirms the significance of the differences between the developed and 
developing country cost functions by comparison with P2. There are significant differences 
in the signs on FUNDING, the year dummy (DummyY4) and other dummy variables.  The 
unrestricted P4 again fits the developing country data better than the restricted P3 with an 
adjusted-R2 of 68% and an F(14,25) value of 4.9.   
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In terms of system complexity, P4 provides coefficients that are statistically significant at 
the 5% level for generation capacity (and its square) and also for (the square of) the number 
of companies – unlike developed countries.  Interestingly, imposing civil service pay scales 
has a highly significant negative impact (at the 1% level) in P4 on the number of 
professional staff employed in developing countries. This effect is not found in P2 or S4.  
As with total staff, P4 shows that the age of the regulatory agency has a substantial and 
statistically significant effect on the number of professional staff employed.  In P2 (for 
developed countries), the only age effect is negative, albeit insignificant at the 10% level. 
 
We note that in comparing P2 with P4 (as well as S2 with S4), the equations for developed 
countries clearly fit the data better, taking account of the differences in the number of 
degrees of freedom. We also observe significant differences in functional form. These 
results suggest that developed countries have better defined, but significantly different 
regulatory cost functions relative to those in developing countries 
 
As for total staff we performed a number of tests of the differences in functional form of 
the cost functions faced by developed and developing countries. The most directly 
comparable equations are P2 and P3. These indicate that the elasticity at median values for 
developing countries with respect to customer numbers is 0.34 using P2 and 0.24 using P3. 
However this difference is not statistically significant (given the large amount of noise in 
the data). However there are the very significant differences in the predicted total staff 
numbers for the sample of developing countries using equations P2 and P4. These 
predictions are reported in Appendix 3.9  
 
6.4. Discussion of Results in the Context of Developing Countries 
 
We have demonstrated that:  
 
(i)  there are large fixed costs in electricity regulation for developing countries; and  
(ii) the nature of the cost function is significantly different from that of developed 
countries.  
 
These general results can readily be illustrated by some representative examples.  
                                                          
9
 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient indicates a very low correlations between the predicted values 
using P2 and P4 (0.04); this value is not significantly different from zero. 
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Consider Sweden and Jamaica.  They have regulatory agencies which are approximately 
the same size in terms of total staff (30 and 28) but the population of Sweden is more than 
3 times that of Jamaica and the number of electricity customers 10 times as many. In 
addition, the Jamaican regulator is responsible for 3 sectors (including telecoms and water) 
unlike the Swedish regulator, which is responsible for 2 sectors only – electricity and 
natural gas.  Clearly Jamaica has to spread more staff over a smaller electricity sector.  
 
Evaluating the required number of staff at the mean and median values customer numbers, 
generation capacity and number of companies we find that the predicted numbers using the 
different equations are as in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Predicted Staff Numbers at Typical Values10 
Category Based on 
Actual  
Total  
Staff 
Actual 
Professional 
Staff S2 P2 S3 P3 S4 P4 
Mean 130 81 130 42     
Developed Median 51 32 53 34     
Mean 72 48   43 23 47 30 
Developing Median 51 37   34 20 30 15 
 
Table 7 indicates that using median values of the variables, a typical developing country 
regulator needs a total staff of between 30 and 34 total staff (using equations S3 and S4) 
compared to a developed country, which needs an estimated 53 staff. This is in spite of the 
median developed country having 3 times the number of electricity customers and three 
rather than two sectors to regulate. This clearly illustrates the nature of the high fixed 
resource cost facing small developing countries.  
 
Our equations can also be used to suggest the number of staff required for countries that 
are not included in our current sample. For instance we predict staff numbers for three 
developing countries in Table 8 using the S4 and P4 regressions. The predictions indicate 
the reasonably large independent regulatory office that these relatively small (compared to 
developed countries) developing countries would require. 
 
Table 8: Predicted Staff Numbers for Non-Sample Regulators11 
                                                          
10
 The mean and median values for developing countries were estimated excluding India CERC and Poland 
from the sample, being apparent ‘outliers’ in terms of characteristics. This is because India CERC contains ¾ 
of the total population of the developing countries sample and Poland contains ¾ of the total number of 
companies in the developing country sample. Together  these give rise to a mean country with characteristics 
not very similar to any particular country. 
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 NCUSMN NCOMP GENCAP PCGDP KWh/Capita Predicted 
STAFF (S4) 
Predicted  
PROF (P4) 
Zambia 1.816 1 2436 0.465 540 57 45
Sri Lanka 3.560 1 1600 0.856 255.3 48 26
Guatemala 2.073 17 1150 1.667 341.2 58 33
 
7. Conclusions 
 
One major finding of this paper is that there is a very substantial ‘fixed cost’ element in 
regulation. This ‘minimum staffing cost’ incurred by regulatory institutions is needed to 
ensure it’s the continuity and effectiveness of electricity regulatory agencies. The necessary 
minimum varies between countries or jurisdictions depending on the size of the system, 
regulatory and economic environments. However, even for small countries with limited 
electricity systems, our estimates suggest that the number of regulatory staff required is 
around 30 including 15 professional staff.  This is a significant fixed cost for small, low-
income countries.  
 
We also find significant differences in the nature of regulatory cost functions between 
developed and developing countries. The cost equation for developing countries is much 
better defined than that for developing countries and the shape of the cost functions are 
significantly different. This suggests that many developing countries face a difficult 
struggle to establish an effective regulatory structure for the particular conditions that they 
face. 
 
Although competition within the regulated industry is believed, eventually, to reduce the 
need for regulation (and hence the number of personnel required to conduct regulatory 
affairs), there is no sign of this happening as yet. Furthermore, regulation is becoming more 
challenging with rapidly changing structure of utilities often combining monopolistic 
elements with competitive segments of the industry. With this increasing complexity, 
regulation appears to require more rather than fewer professionals, but our results provide 
only weak support for this view.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
11
 The number of customers (NCUSMN) has been estimated using population (WDI) times the ratio of 
NCUSMN to population for other developing countries (equal to 0.18). The number of companies for 
Guatemala was obtained from the EIA website: www.eia.doe.gov/emau/cabs. From the same source, data on 
the installed generating capacity, per capita electricity consumption and per capita GDP, were obtained. 
Unless otherwise known we set the dummy variables to represent non-civil service pay scale, privately 
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The positive relationship between staff numbers and the age of the regulatory agency (at 
least in developing countries) may be a sign that regulatory complexity has increased in 
recent years as regulators have become more established and actively promoted 
competition over their networks. Alternatively, it may indicate that regulatory institutions 
have become less efficient as the institution has aged (at least with respect to minimising 
their own costs). It remains to be established which of these factors is more important; 
whether the effects are largely offsetting or whether some other factors are at work.  The 
interpretation of the results in this area is particularly difficult since no significant age 
effects and only limited complexity effects (e.g. in terms of number of companies) were 
found in the better determined equations for developed countries. 
 
Smaller economies can benefit from some scope economies by choosing multi-sectoral 
regulatory institutions. This paper confirms that the effort to set up effective regulatory 
institutions for utility regulation may be hampered not only by the general level of 
corruption or the budget allocated to these institutions, but more importantly by the lack of 
availability of adequately trained staff to run the regulatory agencies. For developing 
country governments and aid agencies, the message is that tackling corruption and having 
multi-sectoral agencies are the best short-term responses, with higher education and 
training, as the necessary long-term response.  In addition, sharing regulatory resources 
between countries, formally or informally, (as in small Caribbean island telecom 
regulation) may also help alleviate human resource problems, particularly for professional 
staff. 
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APPENDIX 1: Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaire on the Regulation of Electric Utilities in the World 
1. Please specify the size of the electricity supply industry in your country or under 
your jurisdiction based on the following criteria: 
Total (route) Length of (transmission and distribution) network (km), __________ 
Total installed generation Capacity (MW), __________ 
Total Number of Customers,__________ of which __________(%) are residential  
Area under Jurisdiction, ______________Km2 
Total units Supplied (MWh), _____________ 
2. What proportion (%) of assets in each of the following are privately owned: 
 Generation               Transmission              Distribution                   Supply 
3. Which of the function(s) are regulated by you or your institution? (Please tick) 
 Generation               Transmission              Distribution               Supply 
4. Is there an Electricity or Energy Regulatory Act or Law, which defines the aims, 
and scope of such regulations? Yes            No   When was the Law (Act) 
first in force __________ and when was it last amended _________? 
5. Is electricity the only sector that is regulated by your organisation? Yes           No      
If No, please specify the other sector (s)  __________________________ 
6. How many staff (total) are employed by your Regulatory Agency? __________ Out 
of which ________ are professional (example, lawyers, economists, accountants, 
engineers, etc.) and _____ are supportive (photocopiers, general clerical, etc.) staff? 
7. How is the regulatory body financed? Please tick the appropriate box(es). 
Customer levy-financed           Government Budget           Company licence-financed       
8. Is there any specific type of regulation that is applied to the electricity industry 
such as: price-cap           rate of return    supply quality   and/or  others 
________________________________________________________(please specify). 
9. With respect to the price of electricity, does your institution advise     decide       
regulate           and/or impose sanctions             on the industry? (Please tick). 
10. What is the budgetary (average annual) costs of the regulatory agency? _________ 
(state currency) _________ (amount) as at _________ (date). 
(In case there is no definite value assigned within the budget, then please provide an estimate based on staff 
costs (total staff number times average salary) plus an administrative overhead cost). 
11. Is there a civil service pay scale applicable to your Regulatory Agency? Yes       No 
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APPENDIX 3: Predicted Staff Numbers for Developing Countries using different equations 
 Prediction S2 Prediction S4 Prediction P2 Prediction P4
Albania 34 24 19 7
Armenia 19 47 6 47
Bolivia 21 66 7 38
Cambodia 15 103 5 66
Costa Rica 47 135 10 101
Dominican 
Republic 15 39 3 31
Ecuador 36 32 13 18
El Salvador 38 63 9 55
Ethiopia 32 29 19 15
Grenada 60 6 45 4
India CERC 1242 99 2038 39
India_Orissa 76 44 51 20
Jamaica 14 30 9 36
Kenya 8 19 4 8
Lithuania 47 34 32 26
Malaysia 85 141 45 37
Namibia 29 13 9 5
Nicaragua 28 49 7 43
Nigeria 41 55 49 28
Peru 51 67 19 36
Philippines 55 269 12 174
Poland 135 284 102 228
Romania 85 93 50 81
Russia 145 19 545 19
Sudan 35 28 15 12
Uganda 7 19 3 5
 
